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Abstract
Background: In countries with low hepatitis A (HA) endemicity, infected food handlers are the source of most
reported foodborne outbreaks. In Canada, accessible data repositories of infected food handler incidents are not
available. We undertook a systematic review of such incidents to evaluate the extent of viral transmission through
food contamination and the scope of post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) interventions.
Methods: A systematic search of MEDLINE and EMBASE was conducted to identify published reports of incidents
in Canada. An expanded search of a news repository (i.e., transcripts from newspapers and newscasts) was also
conducted to identify the location and timing of an incident, which was used to retrieve the related report by
contacting local public health departments. Data pertaining to case identification, public health risk, PEP
interventions, and associated costs was independently abstracted by two reviewers and summarized according to
incidents with and without large PEP interventions.
Results: A total of 16 incidents were identified from 1998–2004. There were approximately 3 incidents requiring
public notification per year. Only 12.5% of incidents were described in published reports, indicating that published
data significantly underestimated the number of incidents and PEP interventions. Data pertaining to the remaining
incidents was unpublished, sparse and highly dispersed at the local public health level.
Six of the 16 incidents required large PEP interventions to immunize on average 5000 potentially exposed
individuals. Secondary transmission was low. Characteristics of incidents requiring large PEP interventions included
potentially infectious food handlers working with uncooked food for a prolonged duration in high-volume grocery
stores in high-density urban areas.
Conclusion: Infected food handlers with hepatitis A virus (HAV) requiring public notification are not infrequent
in Canada. Published data severely underestimated the burden of PEP intervention. Better and consistent reporting
at the local and national level as well as a national data repository should be considered for the management of
future incidents.
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Background
In developed countries, foodborne or waterborne hepati-
tis A (HA) outbreaks are relatively uncommon [1]. How-
ever, infected food handlers remain the source of most
reported foodborne outbreaks [2]. In many low endemic-
ity countries, the potential for food contamination from
an infected food handler is a recognized public health
concern [3]. In these countries, a large proportion of the
population has never been exposed or vaccinated against
hepatitis A virus (HAV) and is thus susceptible to infec-
tion during potential outbreaks [4]. In Canada, an
infected produce worker in a grocery store triggered a post-
exposure prophylaxis (PEP) vaccination campaign of over
19,000 potentially exposed residents, causing substantial
disruption to an urban community [5].
There are currently no data repositories for incidents
involving infected food handlers, although an early detec-
tion system for foodborne outbreaks is in place in Canada
[6]. Laboratory-confirmed cases infected with HAV are
notifiable on a provincial/territorial and national level,
but reporting of follow-up investigations are not manda-
tory beyond local public health units. Consequently, data
are not consolidated and often kept in diverse locations
[7]. Further encumbering this issue is the fact that only a
small proportion of HAV cases are notified. According to
USA data, only 1 in 10 cases are reported via disease noti-
fication systems [8]. We undertook a systematic review of
infected food handler incidents to evaluate the extent of
viral transmission through food contamination and the
scope of PEP interventions.
Methods
A literature search of MEDLINE (1966; year of inception
to March 2005) and EMBASE (1980; year of inception to
March 2005) was conducted (keywords "hepatitis" and
"Canada") to identify published reports of infected food
handler incidents in Canada. All searches were conducted
using the OVID interface. An expanded search (keywords
"hepatitis' AND "food" AND "Canada") of a news reposi-
tory (FPinfoMart and Newscan; transcripts from over 200
national, provincial and local newspapers and newscast
sources: 2000 – the year of establishment – to March
2005) was also conducted to identify the location and
timing of an incident. This information was used to
retrieve the related unpublished report by contacting the
local public health department [9,10]. Archives for the
Canada Diseases Weekly Report (CDWR; 1975 – Dec.
1991, the last year of reporting) and Canada Communica-
ble Disease Report (CCDR; 1992 – Mar. 2005) were also
consulted [11].
A report was included if it described the incident of an
infected food handler in a food establishment in Canada.
Citations, news clips (e.g., titles and the first few sen-
tences), full-text news articles (i.e., newspaper and news-
cast articles), and full-text published reports were
reviewed independently by two reviewers. Disagreements
were resolved through discussion.
Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
framework for the investigation of infectious disease out-
breaks [12,13], data pertaining to case identification, pub-
lic health risk, PEP interventions, and associated costs was
independently abstracted by two reviewers. Data was
summarized according to the extent of post-exposure pro-
phylactic intervention by the local public health in deal-
ing with an infected food handler. Incidents with limited
PEP interventions were those that required 1) a public
notification to advise the public and healthcare providers
to watch out for potential HAV-related symptoms, and/or
2) immunization of close contacts (e.g., family, colleagues
at work). In contrast, incidents with large PEP interven-
tions were those that required 1) a public notification that




Between 1998 and 2004, the systematic review identified
16 incidents of infected food handlers in Canada in total
(Table 1). Only two of these (12.5%) were described in
published communicable disease reports and identified
through MEDLINE (Figure 1) [14,15].
The expanded search identified the location and timing of
15 incidents [5,14-28], one of which was also identified
through the MEDLINE search [15]. This search was sensi-
tive to incidents requiring public notification. Subse-
quently, 3 public health reports and 12 public
notifications were obtained (Figure 1, Table 1).
Case identification
In Canada, approximately 3 incidents of infected food
handlers requiring public notification occurred per year
between 2001 and 2004 (Table 1). There were no second-
ary cases reported in 12 of the 16 infected food handler
cases, most possibly due to timely intervention, high
hygiene standards or non-reporting. Most cases were lab-
oratory confirmed (Table 2). Cause of infection was iden-
tified in 3 of the 16 incidents, including infection
potentially related to high risk sexual activities [14], con-
tact with visitors from high-endemic countries [15], and
food contamination from another infected food handler
[17].
The two incidents identified through MEDLINE were
described in CCDR reports [14,15]. In the first report, a
link analysis found a 6-week gap between case confirma-
tion and public health notification. Several symptomaticBMC Health Services Research 2006, 6:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/6/157
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HAV cases, all linked to the restaurant where the index
case worked, were hospitalized and laboratory-confirmed
at the local hospital. Despite these test results, it was a res-
taurant employee that notified the local public health unit
after noticing jaundice symptoms among these cases [14].
In the second report, prompt reporting and quick follow-
up of a case from a deli led to the largest immunoglobulin
campaign found in this systematic review (n = 5400; Table
1) [15].
Evidence of public health risk
The 16 incidents occurred in 8 restaurants, 4 grocery
stores, 2 hospital food services and 2 food markets (Table
2). Limited PEP interventions were conducted in 7 of the
8 incidents in restaurants. Large PEP interventions were
conducted in 3 of the 4 incidents in grocery stores. Inci-
dents requiring a large PEP intervention were associated
with 1) the potential for contamination of uncooked
food, 2) case notification within 14 days of symptom
onset (e.g., within an acceptable window for PEP inter-
vention), 3) prolonged duration of public exposure prior
to notification, and 4) relatively large number of poten-
tially exposed clients due to high-volume stores located in
high-density urban areas [5,17,20]. The median duration
of exposure was 18.5 days and 8 days for incidents with
large and limited PEP intervention, respectively. In two
incidents involving hospital food facilities, the risk of
repeated exposure was balanced by high hygiene practice
and the existence of standard procedures for infectious
disease control [26,28].
Post-Exposure Prophylactic interventions
Large PEP interventions typically included communicable
disease investigation [5,14,15,20], food inspection and
control [5,17], risk communication (e.g., news confer-
ence, media releases, media interviews, hot-lines and web-
sites [5,20]), immunization clinics [5,15,17,19,20,23],
and surveillance of secondary cases [5]. The median
number of immunized individuals was 5,750 (range 550
– 19,208) in incidents with large PEP intervention (Table
2). In the majority of incidents, risk communication
included details regarding eligibility criteria for immuni-
zation and a qualitative statement regarding the potential
risk to the public (Table 2). Food inspection and control
was only performed in a few of incidents with limited PEP
intervention, yet most of these required risk communica-
tion to the public (Table 2).
Public health cost
Data regarding resource utilization and direct cost to pub-
lic health was limited, except in the incident with the larg-
est PEP intervention [5]. The total direct cost to public
health was $35 per person immunized in a PEP campaign
of approximately 19,000 potentially exposed individuals.
Table 1: Identified incidents of HA infected food handlers with confirmed public health reports (n = 16, 1998–2004)
Timing of 
discovery
City, province Index case, location Total # cases* Public health 
Intervention
# immunized Search method‡, 
reference #
Sep 2004 Okanagan, BC bar worker, restaurant 1 vaccine NR expanded, [27]
Apr 2004 Port Clements, BC vegetable department worker, food 
market
1 vaccine NR expanded, [26]
Apr 2004 Burlington, ON food service worker, hospital cafeteria 1 doctor referral† NA expanded, [25]
Dec 2003 Burlington, ON food service worker, restaurant 1 doctor referral† NA expanded, [24]
Jul 2003 Grand Prairie, AB part-time employee, restaurant 1 IG >550 expanded, [23]
Apr 2003 Whistler, BC food service worker, 2 restaurants 1 doctor referral† NA expanded, [22]
Apr 2003 Winnipeg, MB cases were linked to a restaurant 17 doctor referral† NA expanded, [21]
Sep 2002 London, ON food handler in produce department, 
grocery store
1 vaccine 16,320 expanded, [20]
Sep 2002 Edmonton, AB food handler, ethnic specialty food 
market
1 IG 2,300 expanded, [19]
Aug 2002 Toronto, ON food handler in produce department, 
grocery store
3 vaccine & IG 19,208 expanded, [5]
Mar 2002 Vancouver, BC food service worker, 3 grocery stores 8 vaccine & IG 6,100 expanded, [17]
Apr 2002 Vancouver, BC server, restaurant 1 doctor referral† NA expanded, [28]
Mar 2002 Edmonton, AB worker, lounge 1 IG 50 expanded, [18]
Apr 2001 Victoria, BC food handler, hospital food services 1 vaccine NR expanded, [16]
Jan 2001 Edmonton, AB deli worker, grocery store 1 IG 5,400 MEDLINE & 
expanded [15]
Nov 1998 Montérégie, QB owner and chef, restaurant 7 IG NR MEDLINE [14]
Abbreviations: HA hepatitis A, AB Alberta, BC British Columbia, ON Ontario, QB Quebec, MB Manitoba, NR not reported, NA not applicable, IG 
administration of hepatitis A immune serum globulin, PEP post-exposure prophylaxis.
Notes: *Reported cases only. †Public health asked individuals who displayed any symptoms of hepatitis A to get tested through a family physician. 
‡Search method refers to Medline/EMBASE search or the expanded search (i.e., searching news repository for timing and location, which was then 
verified by the respective public health report).BMC Health Services Research 2006, 6:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/6/157
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This included an average CND $20 for the cost of vaccine
and $15.17 for vaccine administration (i.e., in lieu of vac-
cine clinics, inspections, and the hotline).
Discussion
This systematic review has a number of limitations. The
literature search could only identify incidents with a pub-
lic health notification. These incidents were evaluated to
represent an infection risk to those who consumed food
prepared by HAV infected food handlers and represent a
small and selective sample of all reported incidents of
infected food handlers [2]. In other studies, approxi-
mately 8% of reported HAV cases involve infected food
handlers, approximately 60% of those continue working
while potentially infectious, but only 7% represent an
infection risk to those who ate food they had prepared
[2,12]. Furthermore, the data we collected was sparse;
only one out of every four identified incidents was ade-
quately reported. Finally, although the expanded search
was based upon a news repository of a large number of
data sources, it has only been offering comprehensive cov-
erage since 2000 [9].
Despite these limitations, some major findings could be
derived from the consolidated data. Highly publicized
infected food handlers were not infrequent in Canada.
Only two of the 16 incidents were described in published
communicable disease reports, indicating that published
data severely underestimated the number of incidents and
PEP interventions. These two were probably published
Table 2: Public health investigation of infected food handlers (n = 16, 1998–2004)
Items Large PEP intervention (n = 6) Limited PEP intervention (n = 10)
Case identification
Case confirmation and cause of infection
Laboratory confirmed case 6 7
Known cause of infection 2 1
Duties
Food/drink worker in restaurant/lounge 1 7
Food handler in produce/deli section, grocery/food store 4 0
Food worker in hospital food services/cafeteria 0 2
Food/veggie worker in food market 1 1
Hygiene practice
High standard/met requirements for food handling 4 6
Evidence of public health risk
Timing of discovery
Within 14 days of symptom onset 5 4
> 14 days of symptom onset 0 6
Estimated duration of public exposure in days*
Median (range) [# cases with data] 18.5 (4, 23) [n = 6] 8 (3, 45) [n = 9]
Qualitative estimate of the number of exposed individuals
Estimated number in hundreds or thousands 5 1
Unspecified number of clients over an exposed duration 1 9
Post-exposure prophylaxis intervention
Immunization
Vaccine (or vaccine and immunoglobulin) 3 2
Immunoglobulin 3 4
Doctor referral 0 4
Number of immunized individuals† 5750 (550, 19208) [n = 6] All contacts [n = 2], 50 [n = 1]
Food safety inspection and control
Recall, remove & clean up potentially contaminated food 3 1
Risk communication
Eligibility criteria for vaccination 6 8
Communicate estimated risk to the public 6 9
Public health cost
Reported resources utilization and/or direct cost 5 2
Abbreviations: PEP: post-exposure prophylaxis.
Notes: *Estimated duration of exposure as specified in eligibility criteria for immunization, or number of days working while potentially infectious. 
†Median (range) [# cases with data] for large public health interventions and category (i.e., IG all contacts, IG 50 close contacts) [# cases with data] 
for limited public health interventions.BMC Health Services Research 2006, 6:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/6/157
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due to their atypical nature, as described above. Data per-
taining to the remaining incidents was unpublished,
sparse and highly dispersed at the local public health
level. From a public health perspective, HAV outbreaks
and HAV interventions triggered by infected food han-
dlers should be reported and shared nationally, perhaps
through the CCDR. Relying on published data only will
result in an under-estimation of the burden of public
health interventions.
Large PEP interventions to immunize on average 5000
potentially exposed clients were required in six of the 16
incidents. Secondary transmission was low, although this
could be due to under-reporting, timely intervention or
high hygiene standards. Characteristics of incidents
requiring large PEP interventions included potentially
infectious food handlers working with uncooked food for
a relatively prolonged duration in high-volume grocery
stores located in high-density urban areas. Evaluating sus-
pected cases, assessing the need for PEP intervention and
implementing necessary control measures are common
and time-consuming tasks for public health departments
[2]. Factors associated with large PEP interventions identi-
fied through this research can facilitate the evaluation as
to whether such intervention is merited.
In Canada, there are currently no data repositories for
HAV outbreaks or PEP interventions triggered by HAV
infected food handlers. Laboratory-confirmed cases
infected with HAV are notifiable on a provincial/territo-
rial and national level, but reporting of follow-up investi-
gations are not mandatory beyond local public health
units. Only four of the 16 incidents identified were docu-
mented with sufficient detail at the local public health
level. In one instance, the lack of communication seemed
to contribute to secondary cases that were otherwise pre-
ventable [14]. Increased surveillance, better communica-
tion and data sharing would contribute towards better
management of future cases. Members of our group are
currently conducting a broad and detailed survey of
infected food handlers in Canada.
Reliable data on infected food handlers is required to
accurately evaluate the burden of PEP interventions. For
example, 4,000 more people were vaccinated in the inci-
dent with the largest PEP intervention identified here [5]
than the total number of 15,000 vaccinees during one of
the largest HAV outbreaks in Canada between 1995 and
1997 [29]. In fact, PEP intervention triggered by a single
infected food handler could be more costly to public
health than the control of a peak outbreak in recent years.
It has been suggested that the cost associated with the
management of infected food handlers should be
accounted for in cost-effectiveness evaluations of control
programs. Currently, these management costs are not
commonly accounted for in such analyses [30].
A previous cost effectiveness analysis suggested that vacci-
nating food service workers in states with elevated HAV
rates prior to routine childhood vaccination was cost-
effective [31]. However, a simulation study concluded
that vaccinating restaurant employees was unlikely to be
economical from either the restaurant owner or the soci-
etal perspective, even during HAV epidemics [32]. Our
results showed that limited PEP interventions were suffi-
cient to contain potential transmission from infected food
workers in restaurants. Large PEP interventions might,
however, become necessary in infected cases working in
high-volume food establishments in high-density urban
areas.
Countries such as Canada with low HA endemicity have
experienced declining incidence of new cases of HAV in
the past decade [33]. However, this has led to a decreased
prevalence of antibody to HA in the population, resulting
in an adult population not protected against HAV [33]. In
the meantime, sporadic outbreaks of foodborne HA,
related and unrelated to a food handler, continue to occur
[2,33-35]. Recently, contaminated green onions were
served to customers of a single restaurant in Pennsylvania,
leading to a large outbreak in the United States [34].
HAV-infected food handlers have been the source of most
reported foodborne HA outbreaks. Six outbreaks that
occurred in the 1990s have recently been document in a
review of HA foodborne transmission [2]. Our results are
consistent with observations elsewhere; a single infected
food handler can transmit HAV to dozens or even hun-
dreds of individuals and cause substantial economic bur-
den [2,30]. Specific public health interventions [34,36,37]
are required to contain this form of transmission until
high levels of immunity are achieved across all age groups,
perhaps as a result of routine HA vaccination [33,35].
Universal immunization of young children, implemented
in some western and south-western parts of the United
States, substantially reduced the incidence of HAV [38].
Due to its cost-effectiveness potential, this policy is being
considered for other regions [39,40], including calls for its
expansion nationally [41]. In Canada, the current immu-
nization strategy to control HA is to vaccinate groups at
risk [42]. However, this strategy has been shown as inef-
fective among travelers [43] and very limited data are
available on its effectiveness in other risk groups. Recent
seroprevalence studies indicate that only 3% of children
ages 8–13 are protected against HAV [44], whereas disease
acquisition occurs in adulthood with approximately 10%
of Canadians infected by ages 24–29 [11,45-47]. Concern
with this seemingly lack of protection has led to calls forBMC Health Services Research 2006, 6:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/6/157
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the reassessment of the current policy regarding HA vacci-
nation [4,44,48]. Universal vaccination could eliminate
the spectrum of PEP interventions related to HA cases in
food handlers that emerge periodically [33].
The importance of foodborne viral infections is increas-
ingly recognized [2,3]. Food handlers can transmit infec-
tion during preparation or serving; fruit and vegetables
may be contaminated by fecally contaminated water used
for growing and washing. The globalization of the food
industry and the ease of cross-border shipment of fresh
and frozen food means that a contaminated food item
may not be limited to one location. To meaningfully
monitor increases or decreases in foodborne disease
requires an effective surveillance system at the local and
national levels. This should include standardized report-
ing of foodborne incidents and a national repository for
consolidated data on these incidents.
Conclusion
Infected food handlers with HAV requiring public notifi-
cation are not infrequent in Canada. Published data
severely underestimated the burden of PEP intervention.
Better and consistent reporting at the local and national
level as well as a national data repository should be con-
sidered for the management of future incidents.
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